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CLAIMING ADMISSIONS DATA TRADE SECRETS—




ABSTRACT—The release of documents in recent legal battles between elite 
collegiate institutions and the Students for Fair Admissions, a nonprofit 
group seeking to eradicate the consideration of race in university 
admissions, has brought to question measures taken by the universities to 
shield information relating to their admissions processes from public view. 
These materials included admissions training materials, procedures for 
evaluating applications, and admitted applicant profiles and statistics. An 
examination of the universities’ justifications to prevent public disclosure 
of this information provides insight into their varying reliance on 
intellectual property protections derived for trade secrets. These varying 
justifications help illustrate the complex, ever-changing nature of trade 
secret law, in which even the baseline determination of what may properly 
constitute a trade secret often remains an open question. The SFFA cases 
further highlight how this ambiguity provides fertile grounds for entities 
with commercial interests to strain the boundaries of trade secret law to 
cover business information that, if disclosed to the public, threatens 
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INTRODUCTION 
The release of documents in the most recent legal battle surrounding 
affirmative action has shed light on the shadowy world of elite college 
admissions1 and has brought to question measures taken by academic 
institutions to shield their admissions processes from public view. On 
September 30, 2019, Judge Allison D. Burroughs delivered her much-
anticipated ruling regarding the accusations of plaintiff, Students for Fair 
Admissions (“SFFA”), that defendants, President and Fellows of Harvard 
College, and The Honorable and Reverend the Board of Overseers 
(“Harvard”), employ discriminatory admissions practices against Asian 
American undergraduate applicants.2 Because Harvard receives federal 
funding, SFFA argued that Harvard’s admissions practices violate Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 In her ruling, Judge Burroughs concluded 
that Harvard’s undergraduate admissions process “passes constitutional 
muster,” meeting the strict scrutiny standard set out by the Supreme Court 
for determining the legality of race-conscious admissions practices.4 
Judge Burroughs’s decision comes almost one year after trial for the 
case commenced in October 2018 in the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts5 and almost four years after SFFA filed its initial 
complaint.6 Harvard does not stand alone in the litigation crosshairs of 
SFFA, a nonprofit group whose mission lies in eradicating the 
consideration of race in university admissions.7 Targeting elite universities, 
 
 1 Anemona Hartocollis, Does Harvard Admissions Discriminate? The Lawsuit on Affirmative 
Action, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/us/harvard-
affirmative-action-asian-americans.html [https://perma.cc/LZ64-QVF7]. 
 2 Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & 
Fellows of Harvard Coll. (Harvard Corp.), No. 14-cv-14176-ADB (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2019). 
 3 Complaint, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 14-
cv-14176-DJC (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 2014) [hereinafter SFFA Harvard Complaint]. Harvard receives 
Federal financial assistance through grants and loans (accepting over $13.4 million in 2013) and by 
enrolling students directly supported by Federal financial aid. Id. at 10. 
 4 See Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, supra note 2, at 127. In her 130-page ruling, Judge 
Burroughs explained that Harvard’s admissions process is sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the 
compelling interest of “achiev[ing] diversity and the academic benefits that flow from diversity,” as the 
standard of strict scrutiny requires. 
 5 See Hartocollis, supra note 1. 
 6 See SFFA Harvard Complaint, supra note 3. 
 7 About, Students for Fair Admissions, https://studentsforfairadmissions.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/9B8L-TFN4]. SFFA states that it “believe[s] that racial classifications and preferences 
in college admissions are unfair, unnecessary, and unconstitutional” and describes its mission as one to 
“support and participate in litigation that will restore the original principles of our nation’s civil rights 
movement: A student’s race and ethnicity should not be factors that either harm or help that student to 
gain admission to a competitive university.” Id. 
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SFFA has also accused Princeton University8 of discriminating against 
Asian American applicants, and the group shows no signs of slowing its 
litigious activity any time soon.9 
The national spotlight on the Harvard SFFA case has only intensified 
following Judge Burroughs’s ruling. A few days following the decision’s 
deliverance, SFFA filed its Notice of Appeal,10 raising the possibility that 
the divisive issue of affirmative action will appear before the Supreme 
Court for the first time since its 2016 ruling upholding race-conscious 
admissions practices in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.11 Offstage, 
Harvard took measures to prevent documents detailing its admissions 
processes from entering the public record during trial.12 Ultimately, 
Harvard’s Motion to Seal proved unpersuasive in court.13 Princeton 
University similarly took steps to shield its admissions materials from 
public view through the filing of a reverse Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”) lawsuit.14 
BACKGROUND 
The admissions information that Harvard and Princeton sought to 
keep secret are nearly identical in category and scope, including but not 
limited to admissions training materials, procedures for evaluating 
applications, and admitted applicant profiles and statistics.15 The 
 
 8 Complaint, Students for Fair Admissions Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 1:16-cv-02154-TSC 
(D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2016) [hereinafter SFFA Princeton Complaint]. 
 9 Edward Blum, 2019 Students for Fair Admissions Annual Report, STUDENTS FOR FAIR 
ADMISSIONS 2 (Sept. 4, 2019), https://samv91khoyt2i553a2t1s05i-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/2019-Year-End-Review-Sept-4-2019-1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/NDN9-GM53] 
(noting filing of summary judgment motion against the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and 
refiling of lawsuit against the University of Texas at Austin in April 2019). 
 10 Notice of Appeal, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 
No. 1:14-cv-14176-ADB (D. Mass. Oct. 4, 2019); see also Camille G. Caldera et al., Tuesday’s 
Admissions Decision is Only the First Step in a Long Appeals Process, Experts Say, HARV. CRIMSON 
(Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/10/2/admissions-lawsuit-appeals-process/ 
[https://perma.cc/ET2D-24TZ]. 
 11 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin et al., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016). The Supreme Court in 
Fisher repeatedly affirmed that a compelling interest exists in fostering diversity in educational settings, 
justifying the use of race-conscious admissions practices. See also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 12 Harvard’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Seal Certain Information Filed in 
Connection with the Parties’ Summary Judgment Motions, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 1:14-cv-14176-ADB (D. Mass. Jun. 22, 2018) [hereinafter 
Harvard’s Motion to Seal]. 
 13 See Hartocollis, supra note 1. 
 14 Complaint at 1, Tr. of Princeton Univ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 17-cv-00485-TSC (D.D.C. 
Mar. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Princeton’s Reverse FOIA]. 
 15 See id. at 8; Harvard’s Motion to Seal, supra note 12, at 3. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
118 
similarities fade, however, when examining the universities’ justifications 
for shielding this information from the public, varying notably in their 
reliance on intellectual property protections derived for trade secrets.16 
These varying justifications help illustrate the complex, ever-changing 
nature of trade secret law, in which even the baseline determination of what 
may properly constitute a trade secret often remains an open question. The 
SFFA cases further highlight how this ambiguity provides fertile grounds 
for entities with commercial interests to strain the boundaries of trade 
secret law to cover business information that, if disclosed to the public, 
threatens reputational harm but which may not otherwise rise to the level of 
trade secret.17 
Though this Note relies upon the SFFA cases to help illustrate 
ambiguity in trade secret law, it does not focus on providing an opinion on 
or discussing the merits of SFFA’s accusations of discriminatory 
admissions practices by Harvard and Princeton. Rather, this Note examines 
the legal justifications employed by the universities to shield their 
admissions procedures from the public and considers the possibility that 
these cases illustrate attempts to use trade secret law to suppress 
reputationally-harmful business information with questionable trade secret 
designation. 
This Note traverses these issues described in two Parts. Part I centers 
around an examination of the recent SFFA cases against Harvard and 
Princeton, focusing on efforts by the universities to shield their admissions 
procedures from public view. This section will examine some of the 
primary arguments employed by both universities and will highlight 
differences in their reliance on trade secret protection justifications to 
shield their admissions procedures from public view. Part II weighs the 
arguments and counterarguments for whether Harvard and Princeton’s 
admissions data may properly constitute trade secrets. This Part argues that 
collegiate admissions data should not receive “trade secret” designation, as 
this would form an improper extension of trade secret law. Part II further 
considers the role that trade secret law has increasingly played in providing 
companies a route to prevent public disclosure of information from the 
public that may not rise to the level of a trade secret but which still 
possesses controversial material capable of reputational harm. This Part 
explores the lack of uniformity among the main statutory sources of trade 
secret law and argues that this discord gives rise to litigation strategies 
resembling those employed within the SFFA cases, in which statutory 
 
 16 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 15; Harvard’s Motion to Seal, supra note 12, at 
12. 
 17 Eric E. Johnson, Trade Secret Subject Matter, 33 HAMLINE L. R. 545, 546 (2010). 
17:115 (2019) Claiming Admissions Data Trade Secrets 
119 
ambiguity allows for a straining of the boundaries of trade secret law to 
cover information capable of reputational harm but which may not have 
otherwise qualified for trade secret protection. 
I. RECENT SFFA CASES AGAINST HARVARD AND PRINCETON 
A. The Princeton Case: FOIA Battles and Reliance on Trade Secret 
Protections 
In early 2016, SFFA submitted a Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”) request to the United States Department of Education 
(“Department”), seeking access to documents related to a 2015 
investigation of the undergraduate admissions practices of Princeton 
University by the Department and the New York Office for Civil Rights 
(“OCR”).18 The Freedom of Information Act of 1967 grants citizens the 
right to request records and documents from the government, subject to 
nine exemptions.19 The United States Department of Justice, responsible for 
overseeing FOIA requests, states that “[t]he basic function of the Freedom 
of Information Act is to ensure informed citizens, vital to the functioning of 
a democratic society.”20 The records SFFA wished to obtain detailed the 
results of an investigation by the Department and the OCR to determine 
whether Princeton employed discriminatory admissions practices against 
 
 18 See SFFA Princeton Complaint, supra note 8, at 2. 
 19 Nine FOIA exemptions are as follows:   
Exemption 1: Information that is classified to protect national security. 
Exemption 2: Information related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an 
agency. 
Exemption 3: Information that is prohibited from disclosure by another federal law. 
Exemption 4: Trade secrets or commercial or financial information that is confidential or 
privileged. 
Exemption 5: Privileged communications within or between agencies, including those 
protected by the: 1. Deliberative Process Privilege (provided the records were created less 
than 25 years before the date on which they were requested), 2. Attorney-Work Product 
Privilege, 3. Attorney-Client Privilege. 
Exemption 6: Information that, if disclosed, would invade another individual’s personal 
privacy. 
Exemption 7: Information compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . 
Exemption 8: Information that concerns the supervision of financial institutions. 
Exemption 9: Geological information on wells. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, What is FOIA?, FOIA.GOV, , https://foia.gov/about.html [https://perma.cc/92D3-
QWAJ]. 
 20 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FOIA.GOV, https://foia.gov/ [https://perma.cc/5J92-NB5J]. 
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Asian American applicants on the basis of race, color, or national origin.21 
The investigation ultimately concluded with a finding that Princeton 
University had not employed discriminatory practices in its undergraduate 
admissions processes.22 Nevertheless, SFFA sought access. 
Princeton responded in 2017 with a reverse FOIA23 in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a permanent 
injunction to “prevent the disclosure of certain confidential and 
commercially sensitive documents and information relating to the 
University’s undergraduate admissions program . . . .”24 In its permanent 
injunction claim, Princeton divided the admissions-related materials into 
two categories.25 The first category, titled “Applicant Documents and 
Information,” contained materials about individual undergraduate 
applicants.26 This category encompassed the application packets of specific 
applicants, which included applicants’ personal essays and information 
about their academic and extracurricular performance.27 It also included 
data produced for the OCR’s 2015 investigation of Princeton’s admissions 
practices, such as “narrative responses” to OCR questions, which described 
“detailed information about specific applicants and their families.”28 Of 
higher relevance to this Note is Princeton’s second category of admissions 
data, titled “Admissions Documents and Information,” which contained 
materials about Princeton’s confidential, propriety admissions procedures. 
Specifically, this category included “documents and information” relating 
to Princeton’s admissions program, “demographic and descriptive 
information” of applicants and current Princeton students, and “narrative 
responses” about Princeton’s admissions program.29 
In its reverse FOIA, Princeton relied upon trade secret law to argue 
against mandatory disclosure of both its “Applicant Documents and 
 
 21 Letter from Timothy C.J. Blanchard, Reg’l Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to 
Christopher L. Eisgruber, President, Princeton Univ. 16 & n.12 (Nov. 5, 2014), 
http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/princeton-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TXN-NXLH]. 
 22 Id.; See also Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 1–2. 
 23 Reverse FOIA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy
/2014/07/23/reverse-foia.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW36-868X] (describing a reverse FOIA action as a 
legal measure, typically advanced by an entity who has previously submitted information to a 
government agency pursuant to a third party’s (usually pending) FOIA request to prevent the disclosure 
of some or all of the submitted information to the requesting third party). 
 24 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 1–2. 
 25 Id. at 5. 
 26 Id. at 2, 6, 8. 
 27 Id. at 2. 
 28 Id. at 8. 
 29 These “narrative responses” were presumably submitted to the OCR by members of Princeton’s 
Office of Admission, although Princeton’s Reverse FOIA does not make this clear. See id. 
17:115 (2019) Claiming Admissions Data Trade Secrets 
121 
Information” and “Admissions Documents and Information,” arguing that 
these materials derived protections from two statutory sources of trade 
secret law. First, Princeton argued that FOIA Exemption 4 protected its 
admissions information from disclosure.30 Pursuant to a FOIA request 
initiated by a third party, FOIA Exemption 4 exempts from disclosure 
“trade secrets and commercial or financial information that is confidential 
or privileged.”31 Princeton additionally argued that the Trade Secrets Act32 
protects these materials from disclosure.33 
Princeton’s invocation of these trade secret defenses provides the first 
of many opportunities to illustrate the lack of uniformity across trade secret 
statutory sources in drawing the line between what constitutes a trade secret 
and what constitutes confidential business information, and the 
implications that such designations may have on preventing public 
disclosure of potentially reputationally-harmful information. The scope of 
information which may receive trade secret status under FOIA Exemption 
4 does not directly align with that of the Trade Secrets Act.34 The latter, a 
criminal statute providing for the penalization of government employees 
who make unauthorized trade secret disclosures, does not define what 
constitutes a trade secret.35 However, courts have consistently construed the 
Trade Secrets Act as proffering a broad view on what information should 
receive trade secret protection, covering “practically any commercial or 
financial data collected by any federal employee from any source.”36 
Conversely, FOIA Exemption 4 provides an explicit trade secret 
definition and seems to narrow the scope for what information may 
constitute a trade secret. Under FOIA Exemption 4, a trade secret consists 
of “a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is 
 
 30 See id. at 3–4. 
 31 See What is FOIA?, supra note 19 (listing the nine FOIA exemptions). 
 32 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 4 (noting that information covered by FOIA 
Exemption 4 is typically also protected from disclosure by the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905, 
which protects a broader range of information than FOIA Exemption 4 (citing Bartholdi Cable Co. v. 
FCC, 114 F.3d 274, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1997))). 
 33 Princeton additionally relied upon FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C) and the Privacy Act of 1974 to 
argue against disclosure of private and personally identifying information held within its “Applicant 
Documents and Information” category. See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 13. FOIA 
Exemption 6 covers information that would invade another individual’s personal privacy if disclosed, 
and FOIA Exemption 7(C) covers information compiled for law enforcement purposes that “could 
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. See What is FOIA?, 
supra note 19 (listing the nine FOIA exemptions). 
 34 FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Exemption 4, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/oip
/foia-guide-2004-edition-exemption-4#N_492_ [https://perma.cc/8X8W-7AA2]. 
 35 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2012) (Disclosure of Confidential Information). 
 36 FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Exemption 4, supra note 34 (quoting CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 
830 F.2d 1132, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
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used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade 
commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation 
or substantial effort.”37 The Supreme Court seemingly quashed this 
statutory discrepancy in scope in its 1978 ruling in Chrysler Corp. v. 
Brown, in which it ruled that any distinction in trade secret scope between 
the statutes “is at most of limited practical significance in view of the 
similarity of language between FOIA Exemption 4 and the substantive 
provisions of § 1905.”38 Despite this ruling, some courts have construed 
FOIA Exemption 4 as “defin[ing] the outer scope” of the Trade Secret 
Act.39 
While FOIA Exemption 4 may provide more guidance than the Trade 
Secrets Act in determining whether certain information should receive 
trade secret status, it still allows for ambiguity. The Department of Justice 
makes clear that FOIA Exemption 4 protects two distinct categories of 
information, the first being trade secrets, and the second being confidential 
“commercial or financial information.”40 FOIA Exemption 4 seems to blur 
the line dividing these two categories by including a “commercially 
valuable plan” alongside a “formula, process, or device” in its trade secret 
definition. This may signal to commercial entities that their confidential 
business information is tantamount to a trade secret. The fact that some 
FOIA exemptions cover relatively narrow classes of information 
(Exemption 9, for example, covers “geological information on wells”) 41 
may further justify such a conclusion, as it may suggest that FOIA’s 
drafters have intentionally left together trade secrets and confidential 
business information, rather than placing them into separate, narrower 
exemptions. On the other hand, their simultaneous inclusion may indicate 
that under FOIA Exemption 4, confidential “commercial or financial 
information” exists squarely outside of the trade secret realm, as an 
alternative construction would render at least part of the statute’s trade 
secret definition superfluous.42 
In its reverse FOIA action, Princeton relied on arguments supporting 
both an Exemption 4 trade secret designation and an Exception 4 
confidential business information categorization for the admissions 
 
 37 Id. (quoting Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 
1983)). 
 38 441 U.S. 281 at n. 49. 
 39 Canal Refining Co. v. Corrallo, 616 F. Supp. 1035, 1042 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 40 FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Exemption 4, supra note 34. 
 41 See What is FOIA?, supra note 19 (listing the nine FOIA exemptions). 
 42 FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Exemption 4, supra note 34 (citing Anderson v. HHS, 907 F.2d 936, 
944 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
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materials it wished to shield from disclosure.43 Princeton highlighted the 
fact that it restricted access of the admissions data at issue to only some 
Admissions Office workers and required these individuals to sign non-
disclosure agreements.44 Princeton also addressed the fact that its 
admissions data is commercially valuable and that its disclosure risks 
competitive harm, as required for both Exemption 4 trade secrets and a 
showing of confidential business information.45 Specifically, Princeton 
outlined three negative competitive consequences that would result from 
the public disclosure of its admissions data.46 First, disclosure would allow 
some applicants to tailor their applications based on inferences from the 
released admissions data, which would in turn hinder Princeton’s efforts to 
select the strongest class of incoming students in relation to competing elite 
universities.47 Second, disclosure would allow competing universities to 
access and utilize Princeton’s proprietary admissions strategies and 
processes.48 Finally, Princeton argued that disclosure would deter potential 
applicants from applying by reducing their confidence in Princeton’s ability 
to keep their personal information and admissions materials confidential.49 
The ambiguity in what information may constitute a trade secret 
manifests in Princeton’s reverse FOIA action, in which the university 
avoided explicitly applying trade secret designations to any of its 
admissions material but still relied upon the Trade Secrets Act and 
remedies typically afforded to trade secrets. Princeton requested injunctive 
relief, maintaining that the public release of the “Applicant Documents” 
and “Information and Admissions Documents and Information” would 
cause the University “irreparable injury.”50 Injunctions are considered 
“extraordinary relief,” even in FOIA matters,51 and courts are reluctant to 
 
 43 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 6–12; see also FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: 
Exemption 4, supra note 34 (explaining that a FOIA Exemption 4 confidential “commercial or financial 
information” designation requires a showing that disclosure will likely cause substantial competitive 
harm to the submitter of information). 
 44 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 9. 
 45 Id.; see also FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Exemption 4, supra note 34. 
 46 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 9–10. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 10. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 10 (Princeton sought a permanent injunction based on its understanding that while the 
reverse-FOIA action was still pending, the documents at issue would be held in abeyance, and should 
the threat of disclosure during pendency arise, Princeton could submit a preliminary injunction request). 
 51 Guide to the Freedom of Information Act, U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/sites
/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/litigation-considerations.pdf#p17[https://perma.cc/GQ2E-Q88U]. 
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grant them pursuant to FOIA requests.52 However, trade secrets often 
possess a presumption of irreparable harm upon their unwanted release, 
paving the way for a higher grant-rate of injunctive relief by courts.53 
Strategic litigators could make use of the indefiniteness of the bounds of 
trade secret law to argue for the heightened levels of protection it may 
afford, which may help explain the arguments employed in Princeton’s 
reverse FOIA. 
In September of 2017, the District Court for the District of Columbia 
granted the Department of Education’s motion to stay the litigation in order 
to address discrepancies documents planned for release, so the court’s view 
on the merits of Princeton’s arguments remains unresolved.54 Nevertheless, 
the case provides valuable insight into the ambiguity surrounding trade 
secret law and perhaps illustrates a reliance on trade secret legal protections 
to protect information with uncertain trade secret designation. 
B. The Harvard Case: Use of Motion to Seal and Reliance on 
“Confidential Business Information” Protections 
While Harvard’s objective to shield its admissions materials from the 
public matched Princeton’s, its arguments justifying such protection 
differed significantly. Like Princeton, Harvard divided its admissions 
materials into subcategories, listing three classifications in its Motion to 
Seal.55 The first classification consisted of data related to undergraduate 
applicant files, including completed applications, “summary sheets,” and 
correspondences among those in the Admissions Office, alumni 
interviewers, and high school guidance counselors.56 This first classification 
mirrored Princeton’s “Applicant Documents and Information.” Harvard’s 
second classification consisted of correspondences from external 
organizations, alumni, and donors.57 Harvard primarily relied on privacy 
law protections to prevent disclosure of its admissions materials in these 
first two classifications, citing the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act (“FERPA”) (20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)) and privacy rights case law in its 
Motion to Seal.58 
 
 52 Id. at 17 (citing Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, No. CV F 07-1655 LJODLB, 2008 WL 
108969, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) (“[p]laintiff has not provided any authority for the proposition 
that the claim for the Freedom of Information Act documents supports a claim for an injunction”)). 
 53 ELIZABETH A. ROWE & SHARON K. SANDEEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE SECRET LAW 
448–49 (2d ed. 2017). 
 54 Status Report, Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 16, at 2. 
 55 See Harvard’s Motion to Seal, supra note 12, at 3. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 4, 8–12. 
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The third classification, and the one most relevant to this Note, 
consisted of Harvard’s confidential training materials, admissions 
procedures, and statistics of admitted students.59 This classification closely 
aligns with Princeton’s “Admissions Documents and Information.”60 
Whether material existing under this classification rises to the level of trade 
secret remains similarly questionable. Such information, however, almost 
certainly possesses the potential to impose reputational harm on the 
institution. Harvard’s controversial use of “personal ratings” in its 
admissions criterion, for example, occupied much of the negative press 
attention surrounding this case.61 In her recently delivered opinion, Judge 
Burroughs discussed the personal ratings metric extensively, first 
explaining that it “reflects the admissions officer’s assessment of what kind 
of contribution the applicant would make to the Harvard community based 
on their personal qualities.”62 SFFA relied heavily on admissions data 
illustrating Harvard’s use of personal ratings in its expert report of Dr. 
Peter Arcidiacono, Professor of Economics at Duke University. Dr. 
Arcidiacono designed a logistic regression model to examine six years of 
Harvard undergraduate admissions data, and his report, released at trial and 
now part of the public record, concluded that Harvard’s personal rating 
scores are biased against Asian American applicants.63 Attached to his 
publicly available report are sets of admissions data which Harvard 
strongly opposed filing unsealed.64 In her opinion, Judge Burroughs found 
that while “[t]here is a statistical difference in the personal ratings with 
white applicants faring better that [sic] Asian American applicants,” the 
reason behind Asian American applicants’ lower scores is “unclear [] but 
not the result of intentional discrimination.”65 Judge Burroughs did, 
however, acknowledge that the public scrutiny and potential reputational 
harm resulting from the publicization of these personal ratings may have 
had an impact on Harvard’s admissions procedures going forward, making 
note of Harvard’s overhaul of the use of personal ratings for the class of 
2023.66 
 
 59 Id. at 3. 
 60 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 2–3. 
 61 Anemona Hartocollis, Harvard Rated Asian-American Applicants Lower on Personality Traits, 
Suit Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/us/harvard-asian-
enrollment-applicants.html [https://perma.cc/484H-VMRT]. 
 62 See Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, supra note 2, at 20. 
 63 Id. at 60–61. 
 64 Id.; See also Joint Pretrial Memorandum, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & 
Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 14-cv-14176, at 18–19 (D. Mass. Oct. 1, 2018) [hereinafter SFFA Pretrial 
Memorandum]. 
 65 See Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, supra note 2, at 55–56. 
 66 Id. at 8. 
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Unlike Princeton’s reverse FOIA, which cited both FOIA Exemption 
4 and the Trade Secrets Act to argue against disclosure of its admissions 
materials,67 Harvard’s Motion to Seal focused on doctrinal sources which 
elevated the need to protect competitively harmful business information 
above the public interest in accessing judicial records.68 However its 
arguments, which centered around a showing of competitive harm, closely 
matched Princeton’s. First, Harvard stated that the disclosure of its 
admissions information may result in competitive harm, as undergraduate 
applicants may attempt to “game the system” by altering their applications 
to suit the preferences of Harvard’s Admissions Office and potentially 
impair the ability of the Admissions Office to accurately assess its 
candidates.69 In its next competitive harm argument, Harvard asserted that 
the college-counseling industry may utilize previously confidential 
admissions data to aid “well-resourced applicants,” thereby disadvantaging 
other potentially well-qualified applicants.70 Finally, Harvard argued that 
competing universities might use released admissions materials to refine 
their own recruiting messages to potential applicants.71 
Although Harvard did not explicitly call upon trade secret law to 
justify sealing its admission data from the public record, it relied on case 
law focusing almost exclusively on the protection of trade secrets. For 
example, in its Motion to Seal, Harvard cited trade secret misappropriation 
case CardiAQ Valve Technologies, Inc. v. Neovasc Inc. to argue that its 
admissions data was “business information that might harm a litigant’s 
competitive standing.”72 This suggests that Harvard may consider at least 
some parts of its admissions materials trade secrets, although it stopped 
short of explicitly designating them as such. However, unlike Princeton’s 
reverse FOIA, which included an injunctive relief request, a remedy closely 
associated with trade secret misappropriation, Harvard argued that its 
admissions data should remain under seal at trial. 
II. ADMISSIONS DATA SHOULD NOT QUALIFY AS A TRADE SECRET 
Examinations of Princeton’s reverse FOIA and Harvard’s Motion to 
Seal, both measures taken to block the release of confidential 
 
 67 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 3. 
 68 Harvard’s Motion to Seal, supra note 12, at 7–9 (quoting United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 
61 (1st Cir. 2013)). 
 69 Id. at 13. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 8–9. Harvard also relied upon other trade secrets misappropriation cases, including 
Hilsinger Co. v. Eyeego, LLC, 2014 WL 5475032, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 29, 2014), and Bracco 
Diagnostics Inc. v. Amersham Health Inc., 2007 WL 2085350 at *9–10 (D.N.J. July 18, 2007). 
17:115 (2019) Claiming Admissions Data Trade Secrets 
127 
undergraduate admissions data to the public, reveal that the universities 
seem to rely in varying degrees upon trade secret law for protection of their 
admissions information. From both statutory and judicial perspectives, this 
reliance may illustrate an improper extension of trade secret law to cover 
information that likely does not rise to the level of trade secret. The release 
of most of Harvard’s admissions data into the public record during trial 
against SFFA certainly seems to support this conclusion. Though Judge 
Burroughs ruled in favor of Harvard, she found Harvard’s arguments to 
shield its admissions data from the public record unpersuasive.73 During 
trial, hundreds of formerly proprietary admissions documents, ranging from 
Admissions Office reading procedures to inter-office emails, came to 
light.74 In addition to denying Harvard’s Motion to Seal,75 Judge Burroughs 
described Harvard’s admissions practices in great detail in her opinion, 
quoting directly from its Interviewer Handbook76 and thoroughly describing 
admissions practices such as the “lop process.” Judge Burroughs defined 
the “lop process” as a mechanism Harvard’s Admissions Office employs 
“[w]hen it becomes necessary to reduce the list of prospective admits. . . .” 
and described the full committee meetings that took place in the final 
stages of an admissions cycle, in which admissions officers would discuss 
candidates again and then “lop,” or cut, some from the admitted students 
list.77 
The arguments employed by both Harvard and Princeton to protect 
their admissions materials likely capable of reputational harm but of 
questionable trade secret designation highlight the ambiguity surrounding 
what may constitute a trade secret. Specifically, statutory sources exhibit 
little uniformity with regards to how business information, the broad 
category encompassing the type of information Harvard and Princeton 
sought to protect, fits into trade secret law.78 The discrepancies between 
FOIA Exemption 4 and the Trade Secret Act in defining the scope of 
information qualifying as a trade secret, as seen in Princeton’s reverse 
FOIA, exemplifies this lack of uniformity. Two other major statutory 
sources of trade secret law, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act (amending the Economic Espionage Act), provide 
 
 73 See Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, supra note 2. 
 74 Harvard’s Notice of Filing Corrected Admitted Exhibits List, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. 
v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 1:14-cv-14176-ADB (D. Mass. Nov. 14, 2018). 
 75 See Hartocollis, supra note 1. 
 76 See Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, supra note 2, at 25. 
 77 Id. at 26. 
 78 See David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 775–76 (2009). (“The dominant failure of a state-based trade 
secret regime is that trade secret law differs from state to state.”). 
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further illustrations of this statutory discord that may help explain the 
propensity of entities to strain the boundaries of trade secret law. 
The drafters of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”), enacted in 
48 states,79 lamented the “undue uncertainty concerning the parameters of 
trade secret protection” in their Prefatory Note to the 1985 version of the 
Act.80 Unfortunately, this uncertainty remains present. The UTSA provides 
a definition for a trade secret,81 elements of which several states have 
adopted in their enactments.82 Unfortunately, applying this definition to the 
SFFA cases does not result in an immediately obvious conclusion about 
whether Princeton or Harvard’s admissions materials constitute trade 
secreted information. The admissions data, including application packets, 
admissions training materials, descriptions of admissions practices, and 
admitted students’ statistics83 appears to qualify as “information,” a 
“compilation,” or a “program,” as the UTSA’s definition initially requires.84 
However, state-level enactments of the UTSA vary widely even at this 
initial trade secret definitional question. Some states seem to place strong 
limitations on the scope of business information eligible for trade secret 
protection, requiring technical or scientific information to qualify. Courts in 
such states would likely deny trade secret protection to admissions data, 
which is neither particularly technical nor scientific. Nevada, for example, 
has added to the UTSA’s trade secret definition preamble “product, system, 
process, design, prototype, procedure, computer programming instruction 
 
 79 The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have also enacted the UTSA, 
in addition to the 48 states mentioned. In 2018, the UTSA was enacted in Massachusetts and introduced 
in New York. North Carolina has not adopted the UTSA. See Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=3a2538fb-e030-4e2d-
a9e2-90373dc05792 [https://perma.cc/ZTQ7-KCFS]. 
 80 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT: PREFATORY NOTE, 14 U.L.A. 531 (2005). 
 81 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as: 
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or 
process, that: 
 (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally 
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use, and 
 (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its 
secrecy. 
Id. § 1(4), at 538. 
 82 Id. GENERAL STATUTORY NOTE, at 533–535; see also Trade Secrets Laws and the UTSA: 50 
State and Federal Law Survey, BECK REED RIDEN LLP (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.beckreedriden.com
/trade-secrets-laws-and-the-utsa-a-50-state-and-federal-law-survey-chart/ [https://perma.cc/26SQ-
5D85]. 
 83 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 2, 6, 8; see also Harvard’s Motion to Seal, 
supra note 12, at 3. 
 84 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). 
17:115 (2019) Claiming Admissions Data Trade Secrets 
129 
or code.”85 On the other hand, some states have amended the UTSA’s trade 
secret definition to expressly include business or financial information, and 
admissions materials likely face better odds for qualifying as trade secrets 
in these jurisdictions. Georgia, for example, amended its trade secret 
definition to include “financial data, financial plans, product plans, or a list 
of actual or potential customers or suppliers.”86 Colorado’s UTSA 
enactment enumerates references to both technical87 and confidential 
business information.88 The admissions materials also likely meet the 
UTSA’s requirement of a showing of “reasonable efforts” for maintaining 
secrecy, as both institutions limited access to their admissions documents to 
a select number of individuals within their admissions offices and required 
these individuals to sign confidentiality agreements.89 
The UTSA finally requires a showing of “independent economic 
value” for information to qualify as a trade secret. The admissions 
materials likely fail to fulfill this requirement, in which case arguments that 
they should receive protection as trade secrets would illustrate an improper 
extension of trade secret law. The “independent economic value” 
requirement of the UTSA is more subject to state-level variation than the 
statute’s other two trade secret requirements, further obfuscating the line 
between trade secret and confidential business information. Colorado’s 
statute appears to lower the bar set by the UTSA considerably, requiring 
only that the information is “secret and of value.”90 Massachusetts, where 
the trial between SFFA and Harvard took place, replaces “economic value” 
with “economic advantage” in its UTSA enactment, seemingly 
emphasizing that information qualifying as a trade secret should not only 
possess economic value but must also be competitively valuable and 
capable of producing an economic advantage.91 
The arguments by Harvard in its Motion to Seal and Princeton in its 
reverse FOIA that the disclosure of certain admissions materials would 
result in competitive harm provide starting points for determining whether 
 
 85 NEV. REV. STAT. § 600A.030(5)(a) (2017). 
 86 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-761 (2018). 
 87 COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74-102 (2018) (“the whole or any portion or phase of any scientific or 
technical information”). 
 88 Id. (“improvement, confidential business or financial information, listing of names, addresses, or 
telephone numbers, or other information relating to any business or profession”). 
 89 Harvard’s Motion to Seal, supra note 12, at 17; Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 9; 
see also David Almeling, Darin Snyder et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State 
Courts, 46 Gonzaga L. Rev. 57, 82–83 (2010) (noting “confidentiality agreements with 
employees . . . are the most important factors in the courts’ analysis of reasonable measures”). 
 90 COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74-102 (2018), supra note 88. 
 91 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 42 (West 2018). 
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these admissions materials possess sufficient economic value to qualify as 
trade secrets. On one hand, these materials may possess sufficient 
independent economic value because their release, as both institutions 
argued,92 would allow potential applicants to strategically tailor their 
applications to “game the system” and provide the college counseling 
industry with coveted information.93 The measures that both institutions 
took to keep their admissions procedures secret, such as their use of non-
disclosure agreements and restricted access to admissions data, may further 
suggest that such information possess independent economic value.94 
Colorado’s enactment of the UTSA, requiring simply a showing of secrecy 
and value, rather than independent economic value, would likely classify 
the admissions materials of Harvard and Princeton as trade secrets.95 
On the other hand, many courts have required a showing of actual 
competitive harm to evidence independent economic value,96 a judicial 
hurdle that Harvard and Princeton would be less likely to clear. Identifying 
the institutions’ competitors is necessary to these actual competitive harm 
inquiries, and an examination of the revenue sources of both Harvard97 and 
Princeton98 aids this analysis. Endowments form the highest source of 
revenue for both universities,99 and other elite educational institutions likely 
occupy the associated endowment funding competitive space. It seems 
unlikely that the release of admissions materials would threaten the 
endowments awarded to Harvard and Princeton. Although endowments 
remain subject to donors’ restrictions, their funds are typically managed on 
a long-term basis, “established to exist in perpetuity.”100 Neither Harvard 
 
 92 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 9–10; see also Harvard’s Motion to Seal, supra 
note 12, at 13. 
 93 See Harvard’s Motion to Seal, supra note 12, at 13. 
 94 Id. 
 95 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74-102 (2018), supra note 87. 
 96 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commun. Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1252–53 (N.D. Cal. 
1995) (“A trade secret must have sufficient value in the owner’s operation of its enterprise such that it 
provides an actual or potential advantage over others who do not possess the information.”). 
 97 Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2017, HARVARD UNIV., https://finance.harvard.edu/files/fad/files
/final_harvard_university_financial_report_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5MH-J8KT] (Harvard’s 
sources of revenue for 2017 consisted of the following: 36% endowment income, 21% student fees, 
18% sponsored support, 9% gifts, and 16% other sources). 
 98 Financial Facts, PRINCETON UNIV., https://finance.princeton.edu/princeton-financial-
overv/financial-facts/index.xml [https://perma.cc/2M38-B2TG] (Princeton’s sources of revenue for 
2017 consisted of the following: 47% endowment income, 18% student fees, 18% sponsored support, 
5% gifts, and 12% other sources). 
 99 Id.; See Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 97, at 5. 
 100 Facts About College and University Endowments, ASS’N OF AMERICAN UNIV. (Jan. 26, 2009), 
https://www.aau.edu/key-issues/facts-about-college-and-university-endowments 
[https://perma.cc/X7X6-2SY8]. 
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nor Princeton advanced evidence that the release of their admissions 
materials would diminish these endowments, their highest revenue sources, 
and supply competing universities with the increased funding. 
Student tuition and fees make up the next highest revenue sources for 
Harvard and Princeton.101 Again, competitors in this revenue space likely 
comprise other elite universities. The likelihood of showing competitive 
harm, either actual or potential, here is especially low. The number of 
applications to Harvard and Princeton have continued to climb, with both 
schools receiving their highest number of applications to date for the class 
of 2022 (42,749 and 35,370, respectively).102 More importantly, Harvard 
and Princeton’s overall acceptance rates are the lowest to date and are 
amongst the lowest in the Ivy League (4.6% and 5.5%, respectively).103 
Such low acceptance rates and high application numbers likely render 
claims that released admissions data could harm tuition revenue 
unconvincing. Even arguments that disclosure of data describing previously 
admitted students may allow admitted students more bargaining power in 
financial aid negotiations seem to fall flat. Admitted students may use such 
data to more accurately assess their “worth” in the world of admissions, but 
revenue from student fees hovers only around 20% for both institutions.104 
Possible decreases in fee revenues resulting from more targeted negotiation 
practices by admitted students is unlikely to make much of a financial dent 
for both universities, and thus, is unlikely to support a showing of potential 
competitive harm. Furthermore, Harvard and Princeton’s increasingly low 
admissions rates indicate that even in the face of increased admissions 
transparency, the universities retain the ultimate power of choice in their 
admissions processes, maintaining their abilities to attract the top academic 
talent. 
Harvard and Princeton also both claimed that potential competitive 
harm may result from other universities’ usage of their proprietary 
admissions training materials and procedures. However, a finding of 
competitive harm here is also unlikely. While other universities may find 
 
 101 See Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 99; see also Financial Facts, supra note 
100. 
 102 Rose Lincoln, 1,962 admitted to Class of ‘22, HARVARD GAZETTE (Mar. 18, 2018), 
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2018/03/1962-admitted-to-harvard-college-class-of-22/ 
[https://perma.cc/FJ7M-TXAL]; Admission Statistics, PRINCETON UNIV. (July 15, 2018), 
http://admission-dev.princeton.edu/how-apply/admission-statistics [https://perma.cc/L2HF-UTPJ]. 
 103 Ivy League Statistics by College, IVY COACH, https://www.ivycoach.com/ivy-league-statistics-
by-college/ [https://perma.cc/BAZ3-JM78] The other ivy league schools have the following overall 
acceptance rates for the class of 2022: Columbia 5.5% (tied with Princeton), Yale 6.3%, Brown 7.2%, 
Penn 8.4%, Dartmouth 8.7%, and Cornell 10.3%. 
 104 See Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 97; see also Financial Facts, supra note 98. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
132 
some value in accessing these admissions materials, they likely will not 
extract much competitively advantageous information, as the activities of 
the admissions offices of Harvard and Princeton likely play only a small 
role in luring applicants. Instead, students often target elite universities 
such as Harvard and Princeton based on prestigious reputations and 
opportunities to obtain upward economic and social mobility.105 
Furthermore, in the face of increased competition among student applicants 
and the relative ease of submitting multiple applications, facilitated by the 
Common Application, many students now submit twenty to thirty college 
applications, targeting a broad range of “ultracompetitive” universities.106 
Thus, even if other institutions managed to use released admissions 
materials to lure more applicants, they likely would not successfully deter 
these applicants from also applying to Harvard and Princeton. A finding of 
actual competitive harm to these institutions is therefore unlikely, and the 
many courts that require such a finding to evidence independent economic 
value would likely not consider the admissions materials trade secrets. 
However, given the statutory discord in identifying what information may 
constitute a trade secret, some courts may reach an alternate conclusion. 
The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), amending the Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996, narrowed the UTSA’s trade secret definition, 
aligning closely with certain state-level UTSA enactments which raised the 
bar for trade secret status.107 Unfortunately, even with the federal passage of 
the DTSA, significant ambiguity still arises in trade secret determinations. 
Given that Harvard’s admissions numbers remain strong following the 
release of some of its proprietary admissions procedures, it seems that the 
institution’s primary concern was preventing bad publicity and reputational 
harm. The same likely holds true for Princeton. Many courts have noted 
that in determining whether information possesses sufficient economic 
value to constitute a trade secret, economic advantage and competitive 
 
 105 Raj Chetty et al., Mobility Report Cards: The Role of Colleges in Intergenerational Mobility 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23618, 2017), http://www.equality-of-
opportunity.org/papers/coll_mrc_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5K2-UCKE] (noting that “colleges that 
channel the most children from low- or middle-income families to the top 1% are almost exclusively 
highly selective institutions, such as UC–Berkeley and the Ivy-Plus colleges.”). 
 106 Ariel Kaminer, Applications by the Dozen, as Anxious Seniors Hedge College Bets, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/nyregion/applications-by-the-dozen-as-anxious-
students-hedge-college-bets.html [https://perma.cc/Y7RH-8UEG]. 
 107 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376, 380–81 (amending 18 
U.S.C. § 1839 to read “the term ‘trade secret’ means all forms and types of financial, business, 
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information . . . if (A) the owner thereof has taken 
reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and (B) the information derives independent 
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the 
disclosure or use of the information . . . .”). 
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harm must be present. Reputational harm alone will not satisfy this 
requirement.108 Harvard and Princeton’s reliance on the elevated legal 
remedies typically afforded to trade secrets, such higher injunctive relief 
grant-ratees, seems then to improperly stretch the bounds of trade secret 
law. Given that companies typically regard their reputations as one of their 
most valuable assets,109 litigation strategies pursuing the strongest legal 
protections available is unsurprising. Accordingly, entities wishing to rely 
on the protections of trade secret law to shield dubious, embarrassing 
information from the public “will use all available arguments to their 
advantage and thus they have an incentive to find, emphasize, and litigate 
the variations in state trade secret laws.”110 
The varying degrees of reliance by Harvard and Princeton on trade 
secret law to argue for withholding admissions data fall in line with several 
recent examples of attempts to use trade secret law to protect reputationally 
harmful information that has questionable trade secret status. In a gender-
based class action employment discrimination lawsuit, decided in February 
of 2018, Microsoft attempted to claim information related to its company 
diversity and inclusion data as trade secrets and seal the information from 
the public record.111 This information included training materials and 
“action plans” aimed at enhancing Microsoft’s workplace diversity.112 The 
court found that the release of this information may competitively harm 
Microsoft and found that “Microsoft’s argument that its diversity initiatives 
and strategies are trade secrets to be very persuasive.”113 The information 
Microsoft wished to shield from disclosure also included demographic 
statistics, the number of internal complaints lodged by Microsoft 
employees, and the number of times Microsoft determined that its 
employees violated company policies.114 Here, however, the court noted 
that “tension” exists between “information that may harm a litigant’s 
competitive standing and information that is simply embarrassing or 
incriminating to the business” and ultimately determined that these 
 
 108 Cook Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 206 F.R.D. 244, 248 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (“[B]usiness information 
whose release harms the holder only because the information is embarrassing or reveals weaknesses 
does not qualify for trade secret protection.”). 
 109 James Agarwal et al., Corporate Reputation Measurement: Alternative Factor Structures, 
Nomological Validity, and Organizational Outcomes, J. BUS. ETHICS 130, 485, 502 (2015) (“[G]eneral 
corporate reputation directly leads to a set of valuable organizational outcomes . . . creating additional 
value for all its stakeholders”). 
 110 Almeling, supra note 78, at 776. 
 111 Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., No. 15-cv-1483 JLR, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34685 (W.D. 
Wash. Feb. 16, 2018). 
 112 Id. at *38. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at *20, *38. 
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materials did not constitute trade secrets.115 The Microsoft case illustrates 
the difficulties in delineating what information is simply reputationally 
harmful and what information may cause competitive harm worthy of trade 
secret protection. 
CONCLUSION 
The recent Students for Fair Admissions cases against Harvard and 
Princeton help illustrate the ambiguity of trade secret law and the resulting 
attempts to capitalize on this ambiguity to shield reputationally harmful 
business information. Statutes vary at the threshold issue of definition for a 
trade secret, leaving uncertain what information may qualify for trade 
secret protection. The lack of uniformity among the main statutory sources 
of trade secret law in determining trade secret status may help explain the 
amorphous nature of trade secret law. 
The existence of at least some ambiguity in statutes is to be expected 
and, in some cases, is introduced by legislators intentionally to shift more 
interpretative latitude to the judiciary. With that said, the heightened legal 
protections afforded to trade secrets almost certainly incentivize strategic 
litigators to pursue trade secret claims for reputationally harmful business 
information. Such incentivization may impose societal harm when the 
disclosure of certain information may have better served the interests of the 
public. Increased transparency surrounding college admissions may go 
towards achieving this end, given that experiencing “existential angst” 
about the admissions process has become “a national rite of passage” for 
high school seniors.116 The release of collegiate admissions materials may 
at least allow students to pull back the curtain slightly on the opaque world 
of college admissions, hopefully helping to reduce some of their anxieties. 
The disclosure of Microsoft’s diversity and inclusion data similarly may 
provide public benefit by providing workers the opportunity to make 
better-informed employment decisions. 
The route to preventing public disclosure of information that may not 
rise to the level of a trade secret but which possesses business information 
capable of reputational harm, results, at least in part, from trade secret 
statutory ambiguity. The arguments employed by Harvard and Princeton in 
the SFFA cases illustrate a straining of the boundaries of trade secret 
 
 115 Id. at *33 (The court further noted that “Microsoft’s concern is that the release of the data would 
have a negative effect on its reputation and not so much that it is a trade secret.”). 
 116 Bill McGarvey, We’re sacrificing our kids’ mental health to the college admission industrial 
complex, AMERICA MEDIA (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-
society/2019/04/04/were-sacrificing-our-kids-mental-health-college-admission-industrial 
[https://perma.cc/CD82-FM86]. 
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protections, likely made possible by this lack of uniformity in trade secret 
statutes. The resulting incentivization for litigators to take advantage of this 
statutory ambiguity to obtain more favorable legal remedies may threaten 
the public interest by depriving the public of beneficial information. Trade 
secret law remains amorphous and in a state of constant flux. Legislators, 
judges, and others who help define it should remain vigilant in ensuring 
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